The humanities and the sciences: learning from each other?

I was involved last Thursday in a rich and intriguing conversation in a Humanities Theory Seminar. The objective of the seminar series is "to imagine what a 'theory' course in the humanities might look like." I hadn't participated in earlier meetings in the series, but was attracted by the announced take off point for this particular sesssion, a recently published book in the history of science titled Objectivity. I was interested in finding out how my own recent thinking about "objectivity" and "subjectivity" related to that of humanists. More generally, I was intrigued by the chance to see to what degree humanists share my interest in finding common ground between the humanities and the sciences (cf Two Cultures or One? and Education: Between Two Cultures).

Objectivity uses scientific atlases as an observational foundation for arguing that science has used and continues to use a variety of normative/epistemological standards, with new ones emerging from concerns about older ones without necessarily replacing them. The point is made by calling attention to an older "true to nature" form of illustration (that actually ignored variablity in the interests of showing generality) which in turn, along with technological advances, provoked a mechanical or photographic ideal that was felt by some to be more "objective." More recently, the latter has been challenged by proponents of illustrations reflecting professional expertise, and still more recently by an interest in illustration that involves and to a significant degree celebrates the subjective judgements of the illustrator.

There are a number of intriguing features of this portrayal, among them a picture of science as to a significant degree mirroring biological evolution, with existing forms of inquiry reflecting recognition of shortcomings of prior forms ("getting it less wrong") but also with persistance of earlier forms to the extent they correspond to the needs of particular specific contexts. I'm interested too in the documented pendulum swings with regard to acknowledging the existence and significance of variability.

On a more general level, the book is intriguing, of course, because of the challenge it provides to the notion of "objectivity" as a fixed and eternal feature of science. And, still more generally, the challenge it offers to a contemporary ideal of "objectivity" in the sense of an illustration that is totally devoid of any influence related to distinctive characteristics or perspectives of the illustrator (lacking any "interpretive act"). Along these lines, it was interesting to me that by and large humanists seem to regard challenges to the contemporary ideal of objectivity as largely a problem for scientists, one not particularly of concern for humanists. My own sense, of course, is that all inquiry, humanistic as well as scientific, asserts some claim to one or another form of "objectivity" and so the problem of how to justify such claims is as much a problem for humanists as it is for scientists, and, for that matter, as much a problem for non-academics as it is for academics.

Particularly interesting and challenging to me was a sense that the observations from science that challenge the ideal of a perspective free knowledge (the relativity of velocity, space, and time from physics; the dependence of perception itself on particular, largely unconscious, constructions, from neurobiology) seem to some humanists to carry less weight than others that come from the humanities, such as feminist "standpoint epistemology." The issue, I think, is not only what one is more familiar with but something deeper. Rorty's "Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature" arguments, for example, seem, despite their humanistic context, to be to many humanists less compelling than those of feminist philosophy.

My sense is that both the scientific observations and Rorty's arguments seem to many too remote from human existence and so more or less irrelvant, whereas feminist philosophy draws its power precisely from common human concerns, moral and otherwise, with which people can more readily identify. If so, there is still in some parts of academia (and in the world at large) a "two cultures" split, a sense that science and the humanities involve parallel and non-overlapping inquiries into distinct realms, one taking as a subject value and meaning laden humanity and the other "natural" phenomena where one can put aside concerns of value and meaning.

While there is clear historical precedent for such a split, my own feeling is that recent history provides compelling reasons to move beyond it. Not only is there common ground in recognition of the ubiquity of interpretative acts (and hence some measure of subjectivity) in both the sciences and the humanities but the rise of scientific inquiry into the nature of humanity itself, of the social and brain sciences, makes it increasingly impossible to sustain the notion that scientists must necessarily ignore value and meaning. There is, for example, no way to adequately inquire into the brain and how it works (nor into economics or history or any other of the "social sciences") if one presumes that the enormous part of human experience involving value and meanings is outside the realm of what is being inquired into.

Humans are of course different from rocks, trees, and frogs and scientific inquiries into humanness must of course acknowledge those differences and adjust its methods of inquiry appropriately. And scientists certainly have things to learn from humanists in this regard (cf Revisiting Science in Culture: Science as Story Telling and Story Revising and Making the Unconscious Conscious and Vice Versa). Perhaps, though, humanists have something to learn from scientists as well? While there certainly differences between humans and non-human things there are important commonalities as well. Humanness, with its concern for value and meaning, is not actually a distinct and parallel realm but rather one that has evolved from and so continues to reflect in important ways non-human things and an absence of value and meaning (cf. From Complexity to Emergence and Beyond). Just as scientific inquiry can be usefully be informed by the perspectives and understandings of the sciences, so too could inquiry in the humanities be usefully informed by that of the sciences (cf Education: Between Two Cultures).

Its encouraging to see my colleagues in the humanities getting together to talk about the humanities as a whole, and how to teach it. Perhaps there is in thinking about teaching a route to refreshing our approaches to our own scholarship more generally? Perhaps there should be a Sciences Theory Seminar as well? Maybe in fact there should be also an Inquiry Theory Seminar, one that would explore the existing and potential commonalities among all arenas of inquiry?

@2008 by Paul Grobstein

Sebuah Langkah Keterbelahan Diri

I. Lahirnya Kegelisahan

“Imagine a group of people who have come together to socialize. The conversation is in full swing, lively, almost out of control. One person can hardly wait to have his say till the other is through with his, and everybody takes part more or less actively as in a debate”. (Soren Kierkegaard)

Manusia sebagai mahluk yang mendua telah menjadi bahan penelitian sekaligus melakukan eksplorasi atas kompleksitasnya dalam eksistensi mereka sejak munculnya sebuah peradaban yang pada akhirnya pergerakan dan perubahan tersebut sangat berkaitan erat dengan kebudayaan dalam keseharian mereka. Saat ini, di Indonesia, yang manusianya (masyarakat) masih mengalami proses beradaptasi antara global-lokal pun mengalami konflik untuk memahami diri sendiri dimana kenyataannya mereka masih terlalu dini saat bersentuhan dengan keseharian yang modern sebagai sebuah konsep kebudayaan dalam kesehariannya. Kecenderungan ini mengakibatkan manusia itu mengalami keterasingan pada diri sendiri dengan mereka sadari atau tidak sadari. Keterasingan ini pun berkembang menjadi puncak kejenuhan akan rutinitas pada keseharian mereka. Hingga seakan-akan, menyepi untuk mendapatkan ruang hening menjadi harapan. Bagi saya, disanalah letak konflik manusia saat ini; anxiety (kegelisahan). Ketimpangan dalam tingkatan sosial yang ada pun tidak mampu merangkul manusia dengan manusia lain untuk saling bekerja sama kecuali adanya satu kesetaraan semu yang telah dibentuk oleh kekuasaan yang berlaku. Sehingga manusia yang hidup dalam tatanan yang rapi dengan mengikuti segala aturannya menjadi cenderung kaku, jika boleh saya katakana; sebenarnya mereka telah kehilangan hasrat hidup untuk hidup dengan hidup itu sendiri. Dan manusia pun bermunculan menjadi seorang performer yang sangat handal dalam memanipulasi peran yang sedang dan akan dimainkannya, yang tentu saja tidak lain adalah penghancuran bagi diri sendiri, bahkan manusia di sekitarnya! Terselimuti oleh etika dan moralitas yang baku, kesadaran yang muncul pun menjadi kesadaran yang bukan kesadaran. Dalam hal ini (sebenarnya, ya!) saya menyangkal segala aturan yang berlaku pada tatanan doktrin agama, hukum negara, bahkan budaya dengan segala teori yang berlaku, seperti yang dikatakan oleh Friederich Nietzsche: ‘Pengetahuan demi pengetahuan itu sendiri’ – ini adalah perangkap terakhir yang dipasang oleh moralitas, menjerat kita sepenuhnya sekali lagi’. Bagi saya, sejak manusia memasuki usia lima tahun dimana mulai beradaptasi dengan lingkungan sosial dan pendidikan sekolah, mereka sebagai manusia berangsur-angsur hilang. Sehingga manusia muncul hanya dengan kemanusiaannya saja, dan tentu keadaan ini tidak lain hanyalah kesemuan juga membodohkan. Suatu pandangan yang sangat menyesatkan. Karena mereka telah kehilangan hasrat dan keyakinannya akan insting dan intuisi pada diri sendiri. Nalar dan kesadaran kita selama bertahun-tahun dilatih dan ditata hingga membentuk satu karakter. Manusia dengan tubuhnya menjadi instrument (media) bagi kekuasaan, bisa saja; lingkungan dalam keluarga, lingkungan sosial, atau tatanan negara. Dalam hal ini, mungkinkah kesepakatan itu telah benar-benar kita sepakati sebagai panduan hidup atau kita hanya robot-robot yang sedang berbaris sangat rapi menuju ruang jagal. Akan menjadi perhatian saya selanjutnya; dimanakah letak kesepakatan pribadi? Bisakah kesepakatan pribadi berlaku?, paling tidak untuk diri sendiri. Dan yang paling mendasar, apa sebenarnya kesadaran dan kebenaran? Pendeknya, mampukah kita menjadi manusia dengan jiwa bebas? Bahkan jika keterasingan adalah sahabat kita, jadikan itu sebagai hasrat hidup! Sebagai pengikat hati kita untuk tetap menjadi manusia bebas. Disini keberanian menjadi cambuk yang sangat keji sekaligus melenakan. Karena itu manusia harus menjadikan dirinya sebagai subjek sekaligus objek atas pengalaman-pengalamannya hingga mampu mencapai tingkat kesadaran itu sendiri. Bagaimana pun manusia tidak akan mampu terhindar dari segala tatanan yang telah ada. Bisa dikatakan; bahasa, kata-kata, tata kalimat, bahkan hingga tata jiwa telah tertata rapi sejak kelahiran hingga kematian. Sehingga segala hal yang berlaku di dalam keseharian menjadi dilema yang tidak dapat dihindari dan sudah seharusnya tidak boleh dihindari, kecuali kita memilih menjadi pengecut! Kecenderungan manusia pada saat ini adalah melakukan pengasingan diri di ruang-ruang yang terisolasi dari perkumpulan bahkan ada yang menyepi dan hidup di hutan. Alam seakan-akan menjadikannya hidup damai dan terhindar dari kebisingan. Tapi sampai kapan mereka mampu bertahan terutama bagi para manusia mega kota? Mungkin saja kedamaian hadir dalam inderawi sebagai penyejuk tapi dapat dihitung dengan jari jika keadaan itu bukanlah obat yang mujarab. Karena akan muncul sebuah gelisah yang sesungguhnya; kebisisingan pikiran. Bagaimana pun, kepala (pikiran) kita bukanlah sebuah rel kereta api melainkan jaringan skizoprenik. Jadi, bunuhlah pikiran sebelum pikiran membunuhmu!

II. Ritus Ketelanjangan Diri

“Betapa anehnya penyederhanaan dan pemalsuan kehidupan manusia! Sekali kita mengarahkan mata pada keajaiban ini, maka kita akan dibuat terkagum-kagum selamanya! Lihat bagaimana kita membuat segala sesuatu menjadi cerah, bebas, bersinar dan sederhana!” (Friedrich Nietzsche)

Manusia modern lebih cenderung berproses dalam keinstantan dengan mencari pengobatan dan hingga pengampunan dari manusia lain (sesuatu yang diluar dirinya). Sedangkan pengobatan dan pengampunan itu sebenarnya hanya hadir dalam diri sendiri, dan jiwa kitalah yang hanya mampu menemukan solusinya. Dengan melihat, membaca, merasakan secara langsung secara detail tentang perasaan-perasaan sedih, pedih, senang, keputusasaan, ketidakpastian, hingga kematian akan membawa kita untuk benar-benar menghargai hidup yang kompleks. Kesadaran pun akan muncul dengan sendirinya, dan bahwa manusia hanyalah sekumpulan hewan yang memakai kostum dan berjalan tegak. Dalam contoh subjek di atas ini, memahami psikologi manusia menjadi sebuah proses dalam keseharian manusia itu sendiri adalah mutlak. Persoalan hidup manusia memang selalu dan akan terjadi dalam jalan panjang kehidupannya. Penderitaan dan tekanan psikis seringkali muncul mengiringi masalah tersebut. Kompleksitas ini pada akhirnya menjadi pangkal penderitaan. Derita yang gejalanya diawali dari ketidakmampuan pikiran mengendalikan persoalan tersebut. Kemudian muncul dalam bentuk kemarahan, kegelisahan, perasaan bersalah, hingga depresi. Bahkan dalam hal-hal tertentu dapat menjadi penderitaan fisik. Dari kalangan psikologi menyebut trauma yang disebabkan oleh proses derita mental ini disebut sebagai Psychosomatic Illness. 

Dalam penutup tulisan ini, saya katakan, manusia tidak akan dapat menemukan ruang heningnya jika manusia itu sendiri belum berani mengakui keberadaan dirinya sendiri dan menelanjangi kebinatangannya yang melekat pada dirinya sendiri. Karena hening muncul bukan dari sebuah tempat, tapi hening hadir dalam ruang dan waktu yang sedang kita jalani dalam keseharian kita. Begitulah seharusnya para performer; aktor-aktris maupun penari memaknai proses yang mereka lakoni. Bukan proses yang bertujuan untuk menjadi. Tapi ini sebuah proses yang bergerak bersamaan dengan menjadikan nafas dalam hidup kita, dan kita menjadi tidak terasing dengan peran yang sedang kita lakoni. Dan seni bukanlah sesuatu yang berkembang dari teori yang matematis kemudian karya tercipta dengan sendirinya dari keteraturan dan menjadi fenomenal. Teori adalah musuh terbesar bagi proses penciptaan karya seni itu sendiri. Seni (gerak) adalah sesuatu yang hidup, dia bergerak bersama dengan nafas yang kita miliki. Jika kita tidak mampu melakukan penghancuran bagi segala teori, janganlah berani mengatakan: kita hidup untuk seni! Seni merupakan cinta, sebuah anugrah yang penuh gairah, seni muncul dalam kesenangan sekaligus penderitaan. Dan teori hanya akan menjadi penjara bagi hasrat-hasrat tersebut. Selamat berjuang!

By Okty Budiati @Workshop 2010

Connectionism

The human brain contains approximately 100 billion neurons. Some of them connect to ten thousand other neurons. Together, they form neural networks (see picture). Each ‘unit’ depicts a neuron or a group of neurons. Usually, an artificial neural network is made up of three layers: An input layer, a hidden layer, and an output layer (Thagard, 2005). The input layer receives information, e.g. from our senses, and distributes the signal throughout the network, also known as ‘spreading activation’. The hidden layer does not have an initial interpretation, but serves an important role with respect to its connections with other units. The output unit passes information to other parts of the brain, e.g. to undertake the appropriate action in a particular situation. As an example, when we perceive an object, the input units receive certain properties like “brown, tail, four legs, long hair”. The output units will then able to classify the object as “dog”. Finally, the connections between units can have different strengths, called ‘weights’. These weights can either be positive, resulting in excitation of the neurons they connect to, or negative, resulting in inhibition. The mechanism of learning is, in essence, adjustment of the weights of connections (Thagard, 2005; McLeod, Plunkett & Rolls, 1998). How does a neural network represent knowledge of the world? There are two ways in which a connectionist model can store knowledge: Local and distributed. With local representations, each concept is encoded by a single unit (Plaut, 1999). This is not very likely, however, because it would imply the existence of ‘grandmother cells’, which states that one neuron would be associated with only one specific stimulus (LeVoi, 2005). A more realistic approach is the one of distributed representations, in which concepts are encoded by several units. Distributed representations of knowledge have a few advantages compared to local representations of knowledge. First, damage to a unit, by a head injury for example, does not lead to an immediate loss of all the knowledge stored in the network. This is known as ‘graceful degradation’. Because the concept is stored over several units, the network is still able to maintain the concept fairly accurate (LeVoi, 2005; Thagard, 2005). Second, local representations are economically efficient. That is, multiple concepts can be represented by only one neural network (LeVoi, 2005). The attractive qualities of connectionism as a cognitive theory are manifold. As for one, it is psychologically plausible. For instance, some models of connectionism accurately simulated human performance on word recognition tasks (Thagard, 2005). Furthermore, neural networks are capable of ‘content addressability’. Meaning that, just like humans, the network can bring up all the information that is needed, when it is presented with only a partial cue of that information (LeVoi, 2005). At last, neural networks can process more than one piece of information simultaneously. Therefore connectionism is sometimes referred to as ‘parallel distributed processing’ (PDP), in contrast to rule-based systems such as ACT-R, which operate in a serial fashion (LeVoi, 2005; Thagard, 2005). With the rise of the computer in the 1950s and 1960s, the view of the brain as a parallel information processor became very popular (Thagard, 2005). Later, the idea of neural networks appeared to be of major relevance in the development of artificial intelligence.

@ 2005

Evolutionary Psychology: A Primer

The goal of research in evolutionary psychology is to discover and understand the design of the human mind. Evolutionary psychology is an approach to psychology, in which knowledge and principles from evolutionary biology are put to use in research on the structure of the human mind. It is not an area of study, like vision, reasoning, or social behavior. It is a way of thinking about psychology that can be applied to any topic within it. In this view, the mind is a set of information-processing machines that were designed by natural selection to solve adaptive problems faced by our hunter-gatherer ancestors. This way of thinking about the brain, mind, and behavior is changing how scientists approach old topics, and opening up new ones. This chapter is a primer on the concepts and arguments that animate it. Debauching the mind: Evolutionary psychology's past and present: In the final pages of the Origin of Species, after he had presented the theory of evolution by natural selection, Darwin made a bold prediction: "In the distant future I see open fields for far more important researches. Psychology will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation." Thirty years later, William James tried to do just that in his seminal book, Principles of Psychology, one of the founding works of experimental psychology (James, 1890). In Principles, James talked a lot of "instincts". This term was used to refer (roughly) to specialized neural circuits that are common to every member of a species and are the product of that species' evolutionary history. Taken together, such circuits constitute (in our own species) what one can think of as "human nature". It was (and is) common to think that other animals are ruled by "instinct" whereas humans lost their instincts and are ruled by "reason", and that this is why we are so much more flexibly intelligent than other animals. William James took the opposite view. He argued that human behavior is more flexibly intelligent than that of other animals because we have more instincts than they do, not fewer. We tend to be blind to the existence of these instincts, however, precisely because they work so well -- because they process information so effortlessly and automatically. They structure our thought so powerfully, he argued, that it can be difficult to imagine how things could be otherwise. As a result, we take "normal" behavior for granted. We do not realize that "normal" behavior needs to be explained at all. This "instinct blindness" makes the study of psychology difficult. To get past this problem, James suggested that we try to make the "natural seem strange": "It takes...a mind debauched by learning to carry the process of making the natural seem strange, so far as to ask for the why of any instinctive human act. To the metaphysician alone can such questions occur as: Why do we smile, when pleased, and not scowl? Why are we unable to talk to a crowd as we talk to a single friend? Why does a particular maiden turn our wits so upside-down? The common man can only say, Of course we smile, of course our heart palpitates at the sight of the crowd, of course we love the maiden, that beautiful soul clad in that perfect form, so palpably and flagrantly made for all eternity to be loved! And so, probably, does each animal feel about the particular things it tends to do in the presence of particular objects.... To the lion it is the lioness which is made to be loved; to the bear, the she-bear. To the broody hen the notion would probably seem monstrous that there should be a creature in the world to whom a nestful of eggs was not the utterly fascinating and precious and never-to-be-too-much-sat-upon object which it is to her. Thus we may be sure that, however mysterious some animals' instincts may appear to us, our instincts will appear no less mysterious to them." (William James, 1890) In our view, William James was right about evolutionary psychology. Making the natural seem strange is unnatural -- it requires the twisted outlook seen, for example, in Gary Larson cartoons. Yet it is a pivotal part of the enterprise. Many psychologists avoid the study of natural competences, thinking that there is nothing there to be explained. As a result, social psychologists are disappointed unless they find a phenomenon "that would surprise their grandmothers", and cognitive psychologists spend more time studying how we solve problems we are bad at, like learning math or playing chess, than ones we are good at. But our natural competences -- our abilities to see, to speak, to find someone beautiful, to reciprocate a favor, to fear disease, to fall in love, to initiate an attack, to experience moral outrage, to navigate a landscape, and myriad others -- are possible only because there is a vast and heterogenous array of complex computational machinery supporting and regulating these activities. This machinery works so well that we don't even realize that it exists -- We all suffer from instinct blindness. As a result, psychologists have neglected to study some of the most interesting machinery in the human mind.

By Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, 1997

Kinesthetic System Processing - Feeling as More Information

Our kinesthetic system is our bodily sensations and feelings. These feelings are not the names we give to our sensations that we call emotion. Emotions are mostly evaluations of a set of sensations or learned responses, originating in our brains and translated into body sensations.These sensations and feelings come from three things: Proprioceptive SensationsThese are from our sensory receptors, in our muscles, tendons, joints, and the inner ear. They detect the motion or position of the body or a limb. They are responsible for our balance and our ability to move in our environment.Visceral Sensations relate to our internal organs. We have receptors that let us know about the state of many of our organs, such as hunger, thirst, balance of minerals, hormonal fluctuations. We can become unaware of many of these sensations until they become painful.Tactile sensations these come from the nerves in our skin. They are our interface with the outside world and other beings. We notice texture, pressure, temperature and the location of the stimulus. We also register pain. Kinesthetic System ProcessingThis kind of processing is much slower than visual system processing where a lot of information is available all at once. It is also slower than auditory system processing, where information is sequential and sometimes like a train on tracks.Generally, it is one of our primitive types of processing, and can be simultaneous and conflicting. Having said all that, it can be very fast, for instance in emergencies. When there is a tiger nearby, it is more useful to pay attention to what your stomach is telling you and run like crazy. Kinesthetic WordsPeople who are processing using the kinesthetic system use words such as:Feel, touch, caress, handle, texture, feeling, hold, grip, cuddle, hug, rub, weighty, heavy, burden, oppressive, stifling, sticky, uncomfortable, pressure. Kinesthetic CluesThey pay attention to their bodies and feelings.They learn by doing, and so have difficulty with traditional education methods they like to touch things and peopleThey will want to wear comfortable clothes and shoes rather than what looks good.They tend to speak more slowly. Feelings take a lot more time to process than pictures.They will make decisions based on how they feel. Kinesthetic Processing Eye Patterns. A preference for kinesthetic processing show eyes moving down right (for most right-handed people). They may not make eye contact because that stops them being able to feel.

"What does the word "psychosomatic" really mean?" A Historical and Semantic Inquiry

Semantics and history of psychosomatic medicine are not popular topics nowadays, if they ever were; yet both of them constitute indispensable facets of any discipline that lays claim to a separate identity, as psychosomatic does. The latter, being an inchoate and inherently complex field of study, is especially in need of repeated efforts to clarify the meaning of its key terms, to delineate its scope, and to chart its development over time. Such efforts should pay off in improved teaching of this subject and in more effective communication with workers in other disciplines and with the general public. I have tried in this paper to sketch the historic development of psychosomatic conceptions and address some relevant semantic issues. It appears that early in this century, the convergence of two ancient conceptions, the holistic and the psychogenic, prepared the ground for the emergence in the 1930s of psychosomatic medicine as an organized scientific discipline and a counter reformation against the mechanistic view of man and medicine. Those two conceptions came to be subsumed by the word "psychosomatic" and thus contributed its two distinct connotations. The latter have not usually been clearly distinguished; hence, the ambiguity of the term. I have argued that only the holistic connotation should be retained, as it properly conveys the contemporary viewpoint. It is unfortunate that the word "holistic" has been appropriated recently by an anti-scientific and anti-intellectual so-called "holistic health movement", with resulting increment in semantic confusion and, in the eyes of many, loss of credibility for the misappropriated term. However, to retain it has merit as it is short, simple, and derived from the Greek - as were the very conceptions it has come to connote. Moreover, "holistic" has been part of the basic vocabulary of psychosomatic medicine from the beginning and conveys its core premises and purpose faithfully. As a historian aptly put it, the historic function of the psychosomatic movement has been to "vitalize the whole of medicine, psychiatry no less with the holistic and ecologic viewpoint".

By ZJ Lipowski

Copyright © 1984 American Psychosomatic Society